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Abstract
Our research uses laboratory experiments to examine the theoretical results of competition
between suppliers in an outsourcing setup. We consider a supply chain in which a single buyer
needs to outsource the manufacturing of a product among N potential suppliers. The buyer
allocates demand to suppliers not on the basis of price, but rather on service. We analyze the
levels of service suppliers will decide to provide when competing on three different criteria
specified by the buyer. For the first, suppliers compete by providing the buyer a specific service
level (fill-rate), and for the second by maintaining a specific quantity of on-hand inventory. For
the third criteria, suppliers compete based on a parameter designed to optimize the supply chain
in favor of the buyer. Prior research and existing theory predict that the decisions will reach
stability at the Nash equilibrium for all three types of competition. Theory also predicts these
equilibrium points will be ordered, from competitions based on service level as the lowest and
those based on the optimal criteria as the highest.
Our experimental results show that the equilibrium points reached by subjects are in fact ordered
as theory predicts. However, there are large and statistically significant differences between
those equilibrium points and the theoretical predictions. Using the Quantal Response Equilibrium
(QRE) we show that random errors can explain some of these discrepancies. Our analyses also
suggest that, under optimal criteria for competition, other behavioral factors such as rival chasing
and loss aversion can play an influential role.

Keywords: Behavioral Operations Management; Outsourcing; Inventory Competition; Service
Competition; Optimal Mechanism
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1. Introduction
The importance of outsourcing is widely accepted both in academia and among the practitioners.
Outsourcing, among other benefits, let companies focus on their core competencies and be more
flexible in this increasingly competitive and volatile business world. What is still debatable
among the experts is how to perform the outsourcing. The traditional approach is to negotiate the
contract terms with the suppliers. Some buyers then add incentives such as revenue sharing or
monetary rewards/penalties based on the quality of service they receive. Another approach,
which can save negotiation efforts, is to let the suppliers compete for the buyer’s business. Many
researchers have studied different forms of supplier competition in an outsourcing setup.
Although outsourcing through competition has been widely studied in the literature, the existing
theoretical results have never been, to the best of our knowledge, subjected to empirical
verification.
In this paper, we use laboratory experiments to investigate whether subjects who play the
role of competing suppliers make decisions according to the theoretical predictions. We use the
results developed by Elahi (2013) as our theoretical basis. Elahi (2013) provides the theoretical
results for different types of competition in an outsourcing setup. The author uses a stylized
queuing model to analyze the competition between make-to-stock suppliers when they compete
for the demand share of a buyer based on different performance measures (competition criteria).
He considers three types of competition. In the first type of competition, each supplier receives a
portion of the buyer’s demand, which is proportional to the service level he guarantees over the
sum of the service levels provided by all suppliers (proportional allocation). Since the demand
share is proportional to the service level, this type of competition is called service competition. In
this type of competition, each supplier can increase his demand share by providing a higher
service level (while considering his competitors’ service levels). Although higher service level
can result in a larger share of the buyer’s business, it also means higher service cost for the
supplier. Here, we measure service by the probability of meeting the buyer’s demand from onhand inventory (fill rate).
In the second type of competition, the buyer’s demand is allocated to the suppliers
proportional to the inventory level that each supplier keeps (inventory competition). A similar
dynamics creates the competition between the suppliers in this case too. In the third type of
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competition, the buyer’s demand is allocated based on a parameter that is designed to intensify
the competition to a level where each supplier exerts his maximum feasible effort (optimal
competition). This parameter is a combination of service level, inventory level, and suppliers’
cost functions. Although using this parameter (as the competition criteria) is more complicated
than using simple criteria such as service or inventory levels, this type of (optimal) competition
can produce the best results for the buyer.
Through our experiments, we first want to verify if the subjects’ decisions converge to the
predicted Nash equilibrium in the three abovementioned types of competition. We also want to
compare the subjects’ decisions under different types of competition and verify if the differences
between these decisions follow the same pattern as the theory predicts. We are specifically
interested to see if the optimal competition can produce the desirable results for the buyer as the
theory promises.
Our results show that the subjects’ decisions do not necessarily converge to the Nash
equilibrium. Under service and inventory competitions, subjects’ decisions are usually higher
than the Nash equilibrium. Under the optimal competition, the subjects’ decisions are usually
lower than the Nash equilibrium, except for the less efficient suppliers when the suppliers’ cost
structures are not identical. Although, subjects cannot generally capture the theoretical Nash
equilibrium, the experimental results show that the subjects, as theory predicts, exert more efforts
under optimal competition than they exert under inventory or service competitions.
We also analyze the subjects’ behavior to provide insights on the reasons behind the
deviation of decisions from the Nash equilibrium. We show that subjects’ loss aversion can
explain the less-than-predicted decisions under optimal competition, especially when the
competing suppliers are identical. When the suppliers have different cost structures under the
optimal competition, we show that subjects’ decisions are affected by their tendency to change
their next decisions toward the current decisions made by their competitors. We call this
behavior “rival chasing”. We also examine the impact of subjects making random error in their
decision making process. Using the Quantal Response Equilibrium approach, we show that
random error can explain, to some extent, the deviations of the subjects’ decisions from the Nash
equilibrium.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section two, we briefly review the
related literature. Section three explains the supply chain model and presents the competition
equilibrium results. Section 4 states our hypotheses. Our experimental design and protocol is
presented in section 5. We present the result of experiments in section 6. The reasons behind the
deviations of the subjects’ decisions from the theoretical predictions are discussed in section 7.
Section 8 provides our concluding remarks.

2. Related Literature
Outsourcing through competition has been widely studied in the literature. Bell & Stidham
(1983) might be the first who study the competition between suppliers (servers). They model the
competition between servers in a market place where customers choose their server in a way to
minimize their waiting cost. Although it is not an outsourcing model, their socially optimal
allocation scheme requires a decision maker who dispatches the customers to servers according
to servers’ processing rates. This is similar to an outsourcing model where a single buyer
allocates her demand to competing suppliers based on a competition criterion. The authors’
socially optimal allocation scheme minimizes the long-run average of customers’ waiting cost.
Since this allocation scheme is based on the suppliers’ processing rate, we can consider it as an
effort-based competition.
Another paper that models outsourcing through effort-based competition is Cachon & Zhang
(2007). The authors model the competition between two identical make-to-order suppliers who
supply to a single buyer. The buyer allocates the demand to the suppliers based on their
processing rates. The authors show the impact of different allocation schemes. In their model, the
buyer’s objective is to maximize the service level provided by the suppliers. They show the form
of a linear allocation function that can produce the best results for the buyer.
There are others who model outsourcing problems through service-based competition. This
stream of research study the competition between suppliers when the share of demand allocated
to each supplier depends on the service level the supplier guarantees.
Gilbert & Weng (1998) model a principal who allocates demand to two competing agents
(service facilities). The identical agents decide about their costly service rates to attract more
demand shares. The principal either allocates the demand to the agents from a single queue or
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from separate queues (equal expected waiting times). They show the conditions which one
allocation might be superior to the other one. Ha et al (2003) model two suppliers who compete
for supply to a customer with deterministic demand. When the identical suppliers compete based
on delivery frequency, the authors (using an EOQ model) show an allocation scheme that
minimizes the customer’s inventory cost. Jin & Ryan (2012) model two identical make-to-stock
suppliers who compete based on both price and service level (fill rate) for demand shares of a
single buyer. The buyer uses an allocation function in which the allocated demand is
proportional to an exponential function. This allocation function is characterized by a parameter
that shows the relative importance of price versus service level. The authors show the optimal
value of this parameter, which minimizes the buyer’s cost.
Benjaafar et al (2007) compare two competition mechanisms: supplier allocation (SA) and
supplier selection (SS). In a supplier allocation (SA) mechanism, each supplier receives a share
of the buyer’s demand which increases with the service level that supplier provides. In a supplier
selection (SS) mechanism, the buyer selects only one supplier to receive the entire demand. The
probability of a supplier being selected increases by the service level he provides. They show
(SS) can result in higher service levels. In addition to service level, Benjaafar et al (2007)
introduce another competition parameter. The authors show a reformulation of their problem in
which they choose the demand-independent component of the service cost (which they name it
supplier’s effort) as the competition parameter. They show that when the demand is allocated
proportional to a power function of this competition parameter, supplier service level can be
maximized. The authors acknowledge that the service-based and effort-based competitions can
lead to different equilibrium service levels. However, they do not actually compare the two types
of competition. Elahi (2007) show an optimal form of allocation function for a service-based
competition which can result in maximum feasible service level for the buyer. A review of
service-based outsourcing can be found in Zhou & Ren (2010).
Elahi (2013) models an outsourcing problem in which make-to-stock suppliers compete for
the demand share of a single buyer. In his model, the author considers the suppliers’ competition
when the buyer’s demand is allocated proportional to a competition criterion (competition
parameter). Elahi (2013) focuses on the impact of the different competition criteria. He considers
three competition criteria: service level (fill rate), inventory level (effort level), and optimal
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competition criteria. Since our laboratory experiments are based on these three types of
competition, we present them in more details in section 3.
In spite of relatively extensive body of theoretical work in this area, there has not been, to the
best of our knowledge, any empirical study that examines supplier competition in outsourcing
problems. This paper could be a first step along this path. There have been experimental studies,
however, in the related fields. Below, we briefly review experimental research in other areas of
supply chain and economics that have some similarities to our outsourcing problem.
Economic contests and games have long been subjected to experimental examination. Rentseeking is one of these games that has the most similarities with the formulation of the supplier
competition in our outsourcing problem. In this game, which was first modeled by Tullock
(1980), contestants compete to win a prize (rent). The prize could be, for instance, the
monopolistic right to provide a service to the public. The probability of winning the prize
increases by the amount of contestant’s expenditure. Since this expenditure (lobbying efforts, for
instance) usually does not create any real value and is spent just to increase the chance of
winning the rent, rent-seeking can be considered as a wasteful use of social wealth. Under certain
conditions, the total expenditure by all contestants could equal the value of the rent (rent
dissipation). Tullock (1980) models the probability of winning the prize as eir

∑ j =1 erj , where
N

ei

is the expenditure of contestant i, N > 1 is the number of contestants and r ≥ 0 determines the
impact of a change in expenditure on the probability of winning. For r = 1 , this form of
probability function is similar to the proportional demand allocation function in our problem.
Therefore, each contestant’s expected profit function would have great similarities to a supplier’s
expected profit function in our outsourcing problem (see section 3).
Milner and Pratt (1989) were the first to conduct laboratory experiments to verify Tullock’s
analysis of rent-seeking. Their experiment considers the competition between two (identical)
rent-seekers. The authors compare the contestants’ mean expenditures for the cases of r = 1 and
r = 3 . Their results confirm the theoretical prediction that higher values of r results in higher

expenditures. However, they observe that the average expenditure for the case of r = 1 is higher
than the Nash equilibrium, while the average expenditure for the case of r = 3 is lower than what
theory predicts. In spite of most experimental researches in this field (including the present
research), Milner and Pratt (1989) let the subjects make sequential decisions within a time
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interval instead of making simultaneous single decisions in a decision period. Moreover, the case
of r = 3 does not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we cannot compare the result
of their experiment for this case with a theoretical benchmark. In a follow up paper, Milner and
Pratt (1991) show that the less risk averse the subjects are, the more their expenditure will be.
Davis and Reilly (1998) also conduct laboratory experiments to examine the outcome of rentseeking contests. They compare the average expenditures of r = 1 with a perfectly discriminating
rent-seeking in which the contestant with the highest expenditure wins the contest with a
probability 100%. This type of rent-seeking corresponds to r = ∞ and can be considered as allpay auction.

They report that the perfectly discriminating rent-seeking results in higher

expenditures than the case of r = 1 does. In both cases, the subjects’ average expenditures are
higher than the Nash prediction. They also show that the subjects’ experience reduces the overdissipation of rent, but cannot eliminate it. This general tendency of competing subjects to make
decisions above the Nash equilibrium values is generally what we observe in our outsourcing
competition too (especially under service and inventory competitions).
Anderson et al (1998) show that for a perfectly discriminating rent-seeking game ( r = ∞ ),
the subjects’ random error can explain the over-dissipation of rent. They use Quantal Response
Equilibrium approach (first introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), to analyze the impact of
subjects’ random error. We will also show how random error can explain (to some extent) the
deviation of subjects’ decisions from the theoretical predictions. Anderson and Staffor (2003)
study the impact of cost heterogeneity and entry fee on the expenditures of contestants in a rent
seeking game. Their laboratory experiments show (among other results) that cost heterogeneity
does not result in a decrease in the total amount of expenditures (as theory predicts). Our
experimental results suggest a similar behavior under service and inventory competition. That is,
when the suppliers are heterogeneous, the sum of subjects’ decisions is higher than what theory
predicts. The literature on experimental studies of rent seeking is not limited to what is
mentioned here. A comprehensive review of this literature, however, is beyond the scope of this
paper. A more detailed review of experimental studies on rent-seeking can be found in Houser
and Stratmann (2012).
The only experimental paper in supply chain that studies simultaneous competition between
decision makers is Chen et al (2012). They examine the competition between retailers (buyers)
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for the limited capacity of a common supplier (seller). They found that the subjects’ average
order is much less than what Nash equilibrium predicts. They attribute this behavior to subjects’
bounded rationality (random errors). The authors use Quantal Response Equilibrium to
incorporate random errors in subjects’ decisions. Similar to Chen et al (2012), we model the
simultaneous competition between decision makers. Our model, however, considers the
competition between suppliers (sellers) for the limited demand of a buyer. Moreover, our
competition criteria is different from what they use in their model.

3. Theoretical Background
In this section, we describe our supply chain model and present the theoretical formulation of the
competition setup for our experiments. We also show the Nash equilibrium decisions for
different types of competition we consider in this research. The supply chain setup in this paper
follows the setup presented in Elahi (2013). The proofs of all the results of this section can also
be found in this reference.
We consider the case of a single buyer who is outsourcing the production of a product among
N potential suppliers. The suppliers manufacture this product in a make-to-stock fashion
according to a base-stock inventory policy. Demand from the buyer is generated according to a
Poisson process with rate λ, with the fraction of demand allocated to supplier i denoted by δ i ,
where 0 < δ i < 1 and

∑

N
i =1

δ i = 1 . Accordingly, demand generated by the buyer arrives at each

supplier with a rate of δ i λ . The variable δ i can be viewed as the probability that ongoing
demand is allocated to supplier i; in aggregate, this translates to the market share awarded to the
supplier.
The suppliers’ production times are exponentially distributed with the rate µ i , and in
response to demand from the buyer, suppliers adjust their capacity (production rate) to maintain
a fixed target utilization ρi , where ρi = δ i λ / µi and 0 < ρi < 1 for supplier i. Hence, for each
supplier the production system can be modeled as an M/M/1 queuing system. The assumptions
of Poisson arrival and exponential processing times, in addition to being plausible in many
practical cases, are common practice in this field since they make the derivations mathematically
tractable (see for instance Gilbert and Weng, 1998; Cachon and Zhang, 2007; Benjaafar et al
2007).
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Finished goods at the suppliers are managed according to a base-stock policy with base stock
level zi ( zi > 0 ) at supplier i. This means that the arrival of demand at supplier i always triggers
a replenishment order with the supplier’s production system. Suppliers incur the inventory
holding cost. That is, each supplier i incurs a holding cost hi per unit of inventory per unit time.
Moreover, each supplier incurs a production cost ci per unit produced, and a capacity cost ki per
unit of capacity (measured in terms of the associated production rate). The revenue for each
supplier is based on the demand they are allocated and the price of the product, p per unit, at
which the buyer procures it. We assume that this price is the same across all suppliers. This can
be the case when the buyer is powerful enough to set the price, or when market mechanisms set
the price (the case of a commodity product for instance). This assumptions means the
competition is based on criteria other than price.
When a supplier cannot fulfill the buyer’s demand from on-hand inventory, we assume the
buyer will wait until the supplier produces the backordered units. We exclude the possibility of
the buyer switching to another supplier. We also exclude the possibility of the buyer procuring
the product from a supplier outside of the pool of competing suppliers, assuming that the product
is not readily available in the market. The assumption of backordering the demand when it
cannot be satisfied from on-hand inventory is consistent with the assumptions in earlier papers
such as Cachon & Zhang (2007) and Benjaafar et al. (2007). Netessine et al. (2006) also use this
assumption in studying the impact of customers’ backordering behavior on the performance of
competing firms in a market. The assumption of backordering the unfulfilled demand is
particularly essential in our competition model, since switching to another supplier violates the
demand allocation rule, which is (as we will discuss below) the basis of the competition.
Backordered demand is costly for the buyer. It might lead to delayed delivery or incomplete
orders shipped to the buyer’s own customers. Backorders can also negatively affect the buyer’s
production system, which are possibly accentuated if a just-in-time system is used. Therefore, the
buyer measures each supplier’s service level in terms of fill rate, si = Pr( I i > 0) . That is, the
probability that a unit demand allocated to a supplier is not backordered and can be fulfilled
immediately from on-hand inventory ( Ii is the inventory level at supplier i). Hence, the buyer’s
objective is to maximize the average service level she receives from her suppliers,

q = ∑ i =1δ i si .
N
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(1)

Maximizing the average service level is equivalent to minimizing the probability of backordered
orders, which in turn means low backordering cost for the buyer.
To encourage the suppliers to provide higher service levels, the buyer let them compete for
larger shares of her demand based a performance measure. The buyer announces this
performance measure, as the criteria for demand allocation, before the competition starts. The
suppliers then simultaneously commit to a level of the announced performance measure, based
on which the demand share of each supplier is determined. We examine three different types of
performance measures, based on which the buyer stages the competition. The buyer’s demand
can be allocated based on the suppliers’ fill-rates (termed here as a service competition), or it can
be allocated based on suppliers’ base-stock level (termed here as an inventory competition). We
also examine the competition based on a combined performance measure designed to intensify
the competition to its highest level. This competition (termed here as optimal competition) can
result in the best outcome for the buyer.
To make a decision, each supplier needs to consider the trade-off between higher revenue
from a larger share of demand and the higher costs of committing to a higher level of the
announced performance measure. Each supplier makes his decision attempting to maximize his
expected profit in light of their competitors’ possible decisions. Below, we explain in more
details each of these three types of competition.
In service competition, each supplier is awarded a demand share proportional to the fill rate
he guarantees. The buyer uses a proportional allocation function α iS ( si , s−i ) which specifies the
fraction of demand allocated to supplier i based on his fill rate si

and the fill rates

s−i = ( s1 ,..., si −1 , si +1 ,..., sN ) offered by supplier i’s competitors. In other words,
s
δ i = α iS ( si , s− i ) = Ni .
∑ j =1 s j

(2)

In inventory competition, a supplier’s demand share depends on his base stock level. In this
type of competition, the buyer uses a proportional allocation function α iI ( zi , z− i ) which specifies
the fraction of demand allocated to supplier i based on his base stock level zi and the base stock
levels z−i = ( z1 ,..., zi −1 , zi +1 ,..., z N ) offered by supplier i’s competitors, which means

δ i = α iI ( zi , z− i ) =
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zi

∑ j =1 z j
N

.

(3)

In optimal competition, buyer’s demand is allocated according to a performance measure, ξi ,
that is a combination of fill-rate and base-stock level.
N


  N −1
ρi
1
Nh
si   .
ξi = 
 zi −
N  λ ( p − c − k / ρi ) 
1 − ρi  

(4)

Therefore, the demand share allocated to supplier i in optimal competition will be

α iO (ξi , ξ −i ) =

ξi

∑

ξ
j =1 j

N

.

(5)

This type of competition can induce the maximum feasible service level for the buyer1. The
performance measure defined in (4) is more complicated and less intuitive than direct measures
like fill rate or base stock level. It is, in fact, an abstract measure that can set the shape of the
profit function such that the competition equilibrium point occurs when each supplier exerts his
maximum effort. In other words, this performance measure can intensify the competition to its
maximum level, where each supplier spends all his revenue (and zero out his profit) to provide
the maximum feasible level of ξi . While under the service and inventory competitions, the
suppliers can earn positive profit, supplier’s profit under optimal competition is always zero.
Note, in the definition of this performance measure, zi and si are interdependent parameters (

si = 1 − ρ zi ). It is not very difficult to show that ξi is an increasing function of either zi or si .
Therefore, when a supplier guarantees the maximum feasible level of ξi , it means that he
guarantees the maximum feasible service level for the buyer, as well2.
Suppliers’ profit functions under each of these competitions are
 ln(1 − si )

π iS ( si , s −i ) = α iS ( si , s −i )λ ( p − ci − ki / ρi ) − hi 

−


ρi
si  ,
1 − ρi 

 ln ρi


ρ
π iI ( zi , z −i ) = α iI ( zi , z −i )λ ( p − ci − ki / ρi ) − hi  zi − i (1 − ρi zi )  , and
1 − ρi



π iO (ξi , ξ −i ) = α iO (ξi , ξ − i )λ ( p − ci − ki / ρi ) −

1

λ ( p − c − k / ρi )
N

( N ξi )

N −1
N

.

(6)
(7)
(8)

Suppliers are bound to provide a positive service level as a participation condition under this type of competition.
Elahi (2013) shows a general form of the performance measure for optimal competition that has the ability to
induce any predefined set of demand shares at the competition equilibrium. The specific form shown in (4) induces
identical demand shares for all suppliers ( δ i = 1/ N ). This is an intuitive selection when the suppliers are
identical. The buyer may also decide to allocate equal demand shares to heterogeneous suppliers to minimize the
risk of relying on a specific supplier. For more detailed discussion see section 6 of Elahi (2013).
2
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This formulation of the problem assumes (a) the buyer can enforce the fill rates or base stock
levels chosen by the suppliers, (b) suppliers’ cost structures are common knowledge (a complete
information setup), and (c) suppliers participate in the competition as long as they can earn a
non-negative expected profit.
These three forms of competition have unique Nash equilibrium. For the case of identical
suppliers, these equilibrium points can be found from
λ( p − c − k / ρ)
 N −1 
sS* =  2 
Service Competition:
ρ 
1
 N  
h
−

*
 (1 − sS ) ln(1/ ρ ) 1 − ρ 
Inventory Competition:

Optimal Competition:

 N −1  λ ( p − c − k / ρ )
z *I =  2 
*
 N   ρ zI +1 1 
h 1 −
ln 
 1 − ρ ρ 
1
ξO* =
N

(9)

(10)

(11)

When the suppliers are not identical, we do not have closed form solutions. Numerical methods
should be used to calculate the equilibrium points. It can be shown that the service competition
results in the lowest service level for the buyer and the optimal competition results in the highest
service level. The inventory competition results in a service level that is in between. As
mentioned before, there is a one to one correspondence between the service level that a supplier
provides and the base-stock level that he keeps. As a result, the highest service level in an
optimal competition means that the suppliers provide the highest level of base-stock under the
optimal competition. Similarly, the lowest level of service in a service competition means that
the suppliers provide the lowest level of base-stock under service competition. We will refer to
this result in our experimental design.

4. Hypotheses
Game theoretic models predict that rational player make decisions according to Nash
equilibrium. Our first three hypotheses then concern the comparison between the subjects’
average decisions and the corresponding Nash equilibriums under different competition setups.
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Hypothesis 1: The average subjects’ decisions is equal to the corresponding Nash equilibrium
under service competition with (a) identical suppliers, (b) suppliers with different production
costs, and (c) suppliers different inventory holding costs.
Hypothesis 2: The average subjects’ decisions is equal to the corresponding Nash equilibrium
under inventory competition with (a) identical suppliers, (b) suppliers with different production
costs, and (c) suppliers different inventory holding costs.
Hypothesis 3: The average subjects’ decisions is equal to the corresponding Nash equilibrium
under optimal competition with (a) identical suppliers, (b) suppliers with different production
costs, and (c) suppliers different inventory holding costs.
The theoretical results also predict that our optimal competition results in the highest service
level for the buyer, while service competition results in the lowest service level for the buyer.
Our next two hypotheses then concern the comparison of the subjects’ average decisions under
different types of competition. As we mentioned in section 3, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the service level (fill-rate) and the suppliers’ base-stock levels.
Therefore, comparing subjects’ decisions (base-stock levels) under different types of competition
is equivalent to comparing the service levels (fill rates) provided by the suppliers.
Hypothesis 4: The average subjects’ decisions under service competition are smaller than the
average subjects’ decisions under inventory competition with (a) identical suppliers, (b) suppliers
with different production costs, and (c) suppliers different inventory holding costs.
Hypothesis 5: The average subjects’ decisions under inventory competition are smaller than the
average subjects’ decisions under optimal competition with (a) identical suppliers, (b) suppliers
with different production costs, and (c) suppliers different inventory holding costs.

5. Experimental Design
To investigate how decision makers perform under the competition and compare the results with
theory, we conducted a series of experiments using nine different treatments. These consisted of
three treatments for each of the service, inventory, and optimal competitions. For each type of
competition, a single treatment was used for suppliers with identical cost structures, and two
treatments were used for heterogeneous costs. The heterogeneity in cost structure was either
because of different production costs or because of different inventory holding costs.
13

In all experiments the buyer’s demand was assumed to arrive at a rate of λ and the price of
the product, p, to be 100. The suppliers incurred a capacity cost of k = 5 per unit product per
unit time to adjust their capacity and keep their utilization at ρ = 0.93 . When the suppliers had
identical cost structures, their production costs and inventory holding costs were the same, with
c1 = c2 = 20 and h1 = h2 = 1 , respectively. For experiments with heterogeneous production costs

the values c1 = 20 and c2 = 60 were used for production coasts. For heterogeneous inventory
holding costs, the values h1 = 1 and h2 = 2 were incorporated. We deliberately chose a relatively
large difference between the production costs and inventory holding costs so that the extent of an
impact from heterogeneity would be more clearly evident.
Subjects in our experiments assumed the role of competing suppliers with the overall goal of
maximizing profits. Each experiment consisted of 30 independent rounds in which a decision
needed to be made. In order to maximize profits, the subjects needed to consider how the buyer
was allocating her demand as well as possible decisions their competitors might make. Under all
forms of competition the decisions subjects made was in the form of base-stock levels. As we
mentioned in section 3, there is a one-to-one correspondence between different performance
measures. Therefore, when a subject selects a certain level of base-stock, the values of fill rate
and optimal performance measure are also set. The reason that subjects’ decisions under all
forms of competition are the base-stock level is the fact that base-stock level is the only practical
decision that can be made in reality. For instance, a supplier cannot directly set a desired fill-rate
in practice. It can only be done through choosing a base-stock level that guarantees that fill-rate.
The subjects for all of our experiments were College of Management students at the
University of Massachusetts, Boston. We conducted the experiments in the College of
Management P5 Computer Lab. The instructors of selected courses let us run the experiments in
their class times as a required class activity.
To provide incentive for students to focus on maximizing profits during the experiment, we
presented each experiment as a contest through which the students could find out how good they
were at making decisions under an uncertain competitive environment. In addition, we offered
cash prizes ($40, $30, and $20) to the three students having the highest total profits after 30
rounds of decision-making. We conducted the experiments in a mix of graduate and
undergraduate classes. Past experimental research in operations management has found that
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decisions made by undergraduate and graduate students are not statistically different. See, for
instance, Katok & Wu (2009) and Elahi (2013).
Since the calculation of a supplier’s profit could be complicated, the experiment software
provided an interactive calculation tool. This tool, which was available throughout the
experiments, enabled subjects to enter a prospective decision and see their profits as a function of
the full range of decisions a competitor could make. The appendix shows the user-interface
including the calculation tool.
A strict protocol was followed for conducting all experiments. At the start of each
experiment session, subjects were asked to read a two-page handout describing the supply chain
setup and the decision-making process for the competition. The content of the handout and a
short demonstration of the experiment software was presented orally next. This presentation was
followed by answering any questions that subjects might have.
The next step in our protocol was to let subjects work with the software and, in particular,
examine the calculation tool. After subjects were familiar with the software and had a sense of
how their decisions, in combination with potential decisions by their competitors, would affect
their profits, we had subjects compete in a 5-round practice session. With any remaining
questions answered, we proceeded to start the actual competition. During the first 10 rounds of
competition, the subjects had 75 seconds to make a decision. Pre-testing showed that after 10
rounds subjects had grasped the competition and no longer needed as much time. We therefore
reduced the time limit to 45 seconds for each of the remaining rounds.
After all subjects had entered a decision or the time limit had expired, a round would end.
The software then paired subjects as competitors randomly (any subject not making a decision
was not paired and assigned a profit of zero). With decisions and competitors assigned, the
software calculated each subject’s share of demand and profit, along with their competitor’s
share and profit. These results, alongside the total profit the subject had accumulated, were
displayed on the screen. At that point, the next round of the competition was begun. See the
appendix for a sample screenshot of the user interface during a competition.
Before the competitions started for experiments involving treatments with heterogeneous
suppliers, the software randomly divided subjects into one of two sets. One set was assigned a
higher cost than the other for either c or h, depending on the particular experiment. We then
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apprised all subjects of which set they were assigned to and that those with higher costs could
expect lower profits than their competitors. Subjects were also made aware that, at the end of
experiments, we would normalize all subjects’ profits with respect to their costs; hence, everyone
had a fair chance of winning the prize money.

6. Results
Tables 1 and 2 show the results of our experiments as well as the corresponding theoretical Nash
equilibrium for identical and heterogeneous suppliers, respectively. To analyze the results of our
experiments, throughout this research, we use Wilcoxon rank sum test (Levine et al 2011, pp.
447-451). The unit of our analysis is the average base-stock decisions made by each subject.
As we can see from these, the subjects’ behaviors under service and inventory competitions
are different from their behaviors under optimal competition. Under service and inventory
competitions, the subjects’ average base-stock decisions are always greater than the
corresponding Nash equilibriums. The p-values listed in tables 1 and 2 show that these
differences are statistically significant. The only exceptions happen under service competition for
both suppliers with different production costs and for the more efficient supplier when inventoryholding costs are different. For these cases, the subjects’ average decisions are statistically
equivalent to the Nash equilibrium. As a result, we can reject Hypothesis 1(a) and all parts of
hypothesis 2. We can also reject hypothesis 1(c) for the less efficient supplier. Hence, we can
conclude that the subjects, under service and inventory competitions, tend to choose base-stock
levels higher than or at least equal to the Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, under optimal competition, we can see that the subjects’ average decisions
are smaller than the corresponding Nash equilibrium when the suppliers are identical. We can
observe the same behavior for the subjects who play the role of more efficient supplier (supplier
1), when the suppliers are not identical. The subjects who play the role of less efficient supplier
(supplier 2), however, do not follow this pattern. Under the optimal competition, all the
differences are significant except for the less efficient supplier when the production costs are
different. Therefore, we can reject hypotheses 3(a) and 3(c). We can also reject 3(b) only for the
more efficient supplier.
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Sample
Size

Nash Equilibrium
Base-stock Level

Experimental
Base-stock
Level

p-value
(two tail)

Service Competition

13

19

24

<0.01

Inventory Competition

12

34

54

<0.01

Optimal Competition

22

77

68

<0.01

Competition Type

Table 1 – Subjects’ average decisions vs. Nash equilibrium (identical suppliers)
Sample
Size

Competition Type

Supplier 1 Base-Stock Level

Supplier 2 Base-Stock Level

p-value
Nash
Experiment (two tailed)
Heterogeneous Suppliers (different production costs: c1=20, c2=60)
Service Competition

18

19

Inventory Competition

24

32

Optimal Competition

28

77

>0.05
0.02
<0.01

19
41
51

Nash

Experiment

p-value
(two tailed)

13

15
26
43

>0.05
0.04
>0.05

19

19
34

44

51

<0.01
<0.01
0.01

18
42

Heterogeneous Suppliers (different inventory holding costs: h1=1, h2=2)
Service Competition

17

19

Inventory Competition

25

33

21
36

Optimal Competition

27

77

58

>0.05
0.04
<0.01

14

Table 2 – Subjects’ average decisions vs. Nash equilibrium (Heterogeneous suppliers)
Tables 3 and 4 compare the subjects’ average decisions under different competition types. As
we can see, the experiment results strongly reject all parts of Hypotheses 4 and 5. This means
that the competition type indeed affects the subjects’ decisions. Although our results show that
the subjects’ average base-stock decisions under optimal competition are smaller than what
theory predicts, the optimal competition still results in average base-stock levels which are
considerably higher than the base-stock levels resulted from the other two forms of competitions.
Therefore, the optimal competition can indeed provide the highest level of average service level
for the buyer.

NA

NB

Competition
(A)

Competition
(B)

p-value
(one tail)

Service (A)
vs.
Inventory (B)

13

12

24

54

<0.001

Inventory (A)
vs.
Optimal (B)

12

22

54

68

<0.001

Competition Types

Table 3 – Subjects’ average base-stock decisions (identical suppliers)
17

Competition Type

Supplier
Type

NA

NB

Competition
(A)

Competition
(B)

p-value
(one tail)

Heterogeneous Suppliers (different production costs: c1=20, c2=60)
Service (A)
vs.
Inventory (B)

Supplier 1

9

11

19

41

<0.005

Supplier 2

9

12

15

27

<0.005

Inventory (A)
vs.
Optimal (B)

Supplier 1

11

7

41

51

<0.001

Supplier 2

12

6

27

43

<0.001

Heterogeneous Suppliers (different inventory holding costs: h1=1, h2=2)
Service (A)
vs.
Inventory (B)

Supplier 1

8

12

21

36

<0.005

Supplier 2

9

13

19

34

<0.001

Inventory (A)
vs.
Optimal (B)

Supplier 1

12

5

36

58

<0.001

Supplier 2

13

5

34

51

<0.001

Table 4 – Subjects’ average base-stock decisions (Heterogeneous suppliers)

7. Discussion
The results of our experiments suggest that the assumption of perfectly rational decision-makers,
which is the underlying assumption in the derivation of Nash equilibrium, does not necessarily
hold for the competition setups studied in this research. To explain the subjects’ behaviors under
different competition setups, we examine different behavioral factors. These behavioral factors
consist of context dependent factors such as loss-aversion and rival chasing, as well as context
independent factors such as random errors. Since our experimental design considers only the
case of competition between two suppliers, we limit our discussion in this section to the
competition between two suppliers too.

7.1. Loss Aversion and Rival Chasing
We can see that under service and inventory competition, the subjects’ average decisions are
greater than the Nash equilibrium or at least (statistically) equal to it. Under optimal competition,
however, we cannot see this pattern. Subjects’ average decisions, under optimal competition, are
smaller than the corresponding Nash equilibrium, except for the less efficient supplier when the
suppliers are heterogeneous.
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To provide some insight on this behavior we first look at a supplier’s profit function in
response to a decision made by his competitor. More specifically, we look at a supplier’s profit
when his competitor chooses either the Nash equilibrium or the average decision we have
observed in our experiments. Figures 1 to 3 show these profit functions. The curves with the
solid lines in these figures show a supplier’s expected profit for different values of his decisions
when his competitor’s decision is the Nash equilibrium value. The curves with the broken line is
the supplier’s expected profit when his competitor’s decision is the average decisions made by
subjects in our experiments.
We first notice that the rate of change in a supplier’s profit around its maximum point is
much steeper under the service competition than that of the inventory or optimal competitions. In
other words, any deviation from the optimal decision is more costly for the suppliers under
service competition than it is under inventory or service competitions. This observation explains
why the gap between subjects’ average decisions and the corresponding Nash equilibrium points
under service competition is (almost always) smaller than the same gap under inventory or
optimal competitions. We can see that, under service competition with heterogeneous suppliers
(different production costs), the subjects have actually managed to (statistically) capture the
Nash equilibrium. This is also the case for the more efficient supplier under the service
competition when the suppliers have different inventory holding costs. This means that although
optimal competition can provide the best results for the buyer (highest service level), it is more
difficult for the subjects to capture the best decisions under optimal competition due to the
relatively flat profit functions around the optimal point. The opposite is true for the service
competition, under which the buyer receives the lowest service level. However, it is easier for the
subjects to capture the optimal point under this competition.
We can also see that if a supplier’s competitor chooses according to the Nash equilibrium,
under optimal competition, any deviation from the best decision will result in a negative profit
for that supplier. Therefore, subjects’ loss aversion can play an important role in this type of
competition. When the suppliers are identical, the only way suppliers can earn positive profit
under optimal competition is when both suppliers’ decisions are lower than the Nash
equilibrium. Although this is not an equilibrium condition, to stay away from the condition that
might result in negative profit, this is exactly what subjects have done in our experiments.
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Service Competition

Inventory Competition

60

60

40

60
z2=34
(Nash)

40

z2=19
(Nash)

20
z2=24
(Exper.)

z2=54
(Exper.)

0

0

20

40

60

80

z2=77 (Nash)
-20

0

100

z2=68 (Exper.)

0

-20

-20

40
20

20

0

Optimal Competition

20

40

60

z1

80

0

100

20

40

60

80

100

z1

z1
○ Nash Equilibrium
□ Experiment Result
Figure 1 – Supplier 1’s profit when the suppliers are identical

Service Competition
60

60
Profit 1
(Nash)

45

15
0
-15

45

(Exper.)

30

30

15

15
Profit 2
(Nash)

(Exper.)

0

Profit 2
(Nash & Exper.)

60

Profit 1
(Nash)

45

(Exper.)

30

Optimal Competition

Inventory Competition

20

40

60

80

100

Profit 1
(Nash)

0

-15
0

Profit 2
(Exper.)

(Exper.)

-15
0

20

z1 or z2

40

60

80

100

0

20

z1 or z2

40

60

80

100

z1 or z2

○ Nash Equilibrium
□ Experiment Result
Figure 2 – Suppliers’ profit when the suppliers heterogeneous (different c)
Inventory Competition

Service Competition
60

60

45

45

30
Profit 1
(Nash)

15
0

Profit 2
(Nash & Exper.)

(Exper.)

-15

80

Profit 1
(Nash)

60

30

40

15

20
(Exper.) Profit 2
(Nash)

0

(Exper.)

Optimal Competition

20

40

60

z1 or z2

80

100

Profit 1
(Nash)

0

-15
0

Profit 2
(Exper.)

(Exper.)

-20
0

20

40

60

z1 or z2

80

100

0

20

40

60

z1 or z2

○ Nash Equilibrium
□ Experiment Result
Figure 3 – Suppliers’ profit when the suppliers heterogeneous (different h)
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100

When the suppliers are heterogeneous, however, the subjects’ behaviors under the optimal
competition depend on the type of the supplier. The subjects who play the role of the more
efficient supplier (supplier 1) still chose base-stock levels that are less than the Nash equilibrium.
The subjects who play the role of the less efficient supplier (supplier 2), on the other hand,
choose base-stock levels that are more than (or equal to) the Nash equilibrium. This different
behavior might be explained by a phenomenon that we observed through examining subjects’
decisions. It seems that the subjects have a tendency to change their decisions toward their
competitors’ last decisions (rival chasing behavior). To formally investigate this tendency we
define the following parameter for each subject i at decision round t.

qit = ( zit − zit +1 )( zit − z tj )
When this parameter is positive, it means supplier i’s next decision ( zit +1 ) moves toward his
competitor’s last decision ( z tj ). A negative value for qit means the supplier’s next decision
moves away from his competitor’s last decision. When qit = 0 , either the supplier does not

change his decision, or the supplier’s and his competitor’s decisions are the same. Table 5 shows
the percentage of positive, negative, and zero values of qit for all suppliers in each competition
setup.
We can see from table 5 that the tendency of subjects to move toward their competitors’ last
decision is much stronger than to move away from it. This is the case for all types of competition
and for both types of suppliers. When the competing suppliers are identical, this tendency should
not have a major impact on the subjects’ average decisions (since their optimal decisions are the
same at the equilibrium point). This rival chasing tendency might result in faster convergence of
subjects’ decisions when the suppliers are identical (even when they converge to an average
decision that is different from the Nash equilibrium). When the suppliers are heterogeneous, the
two types of suppliers have different Nash equilibrium decisions. The rival chasing behavior
might then cause the subjects of type 1 and 2 to converge to decisions that are closer to each
other than the corresponding Nash equilibrium points. We can see this behavior under all types
of competition (the only exception is under inventory competition with different c, in which the
gap between the Nash equilibrium points is almost the same as the gap between the subjects’
average decisions). This behavior is particularly clear under optimal competition where the profit
functions are much flatter around the equilibrium points. A flatter profit function means it is
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more difficult for the subjects to identify the optimal point. As a result, the rival chasing
tendency could play a more influential role. This strong tendency pulls the average decisions of
the subjects of the two types toward each other (lower than Nash equilibrium decisions for type 1
subjects and higher than Nash equilibrium decisions for type 2 subjects). As we can see from
figures 2 and 3, this behavior does not have the same impact on the two types of suppliers. When
the decisions of the two types of the suppliers are pulled toward each other, the more efficient
supplier (supplier 1) ends up with a negative profit, while the less efficient supplier ends up with
a positive profit. We can also see that the difference between the subjects’ average decisions and
the Nash equilibrium is considerably larger for supplier 1 than for supplier 2. Since this pulling
effect result in negative profit for supplier 1, the subjects who play the role of this supplier are
more desperate to improve their profit and therefore they tend to chase their rivals more than
their competitors do. The percentages of positive and negative qit in Table 5 support this
argument.

Competition
Type

Service

Suppliers
identical

Supplier
Type

(0)

(−)

∆

52%

26%

23%

29%

1

55%

10%

35%

20%

(different c)

2

51%

25%

24%

26%

Heterogeneous

1

42%

34%

24%

18%

(different h)

2

52%

24%

24%

29%

44%

29%

27%

17%

Heterogeneous

1

52%

5%

43%

9%

(different c)

2

53%

15%

32%

21%

Heterogeneous

1

50%

11%

38%

12%

(different h)

2

60%

7%

33%

26%

56%

10%

35%

21%

identical
Optimal

(+)

Heterogeneous

identical
Inventory

qit

Heterogeneous

1

56%

16%

28%

29%

(different c)

2

46%

28%

27%

19%

Heterogeneous

1

54%

18%

29%

25%

(different h)

2

46%

19%

35%

10%

∆: difference between the percentage of positive and negative q

t
i

Table 5 – Subjects’ average base-stock decisions (Heterogeneous suppliers)
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7.2. Random Error in Suppliers’ Decisions
One of the approaches used in the literature (both in behavioral economics and experimental
operations management) to explain the potential reasons behind the deviation of subjects’
decisions from the theoretical results is the occurrence of random errors in subjects’ decisions.
For instance, Su (2008) and Kremer et al (2010) apply random error to their model to see if it can
explain the deviation of newsvendors’ decisions from the optimal value. Kremer et al (2010)
conclude that the random error cannot explain the gap between the theory and the experimental
results. Anderson et al (1998) apply the concept of contestants’ random errors in an all-pay
auction (in the context of rent seeking contexts) to see if this model can explain the experimental
results. By incorporating the occurrence of random error, they manage to explain the overdissipation of rents observed in experiments. Chen et al (2012) model an allocation problem in
which two retailers compete for the limited capacity of a common supplier while the retailers
make random error in placing their optimal order quantities. They show that retailers’ random
error can explain the lower than Nash equilibrium order quantities that they observed in their
laboratory experiments.
All these papers use the concept of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) to model the
randomness in players’ decisions. This type of equilibrium, which was first introduced by
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), assumes that each player aims to make the best decision but
makes random error in the process. Therefore, each player’s decision follow a probability
distribution, in which, the best decision (the decision that maximizes the player’s expected
profit) has the highest probability of occurrence. The equilibrium probability distribution is a
fixed point. That is, at the equilibrium, the belief distribution of each player about his opponent’s
decisions is the same as the choice distribution of his opponent. The belief distributions
determine a player’s expected profit for each decision he makes, while the choice distribution is
determined by the expected profit. Chen et al (1997) show the existence and uniqueness of this
equilibrium when the players’ set of choices is discrete and the choice probabilities are described
by a logit distribution. As we explained in section 5, the suppliers’ decisions (choices) in our
three forms of competition are considered to be their base-stock levels, zi . Let Ωi be the set of
possible decisions for supplier i. Using a logit form, the choice probabilities can then be defined
as
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 Eπ ( z ) 
exp  i i 
 β  ,
Pr( zi ) =
 Eπ (ω ) 
exp  i i 
∑
ωi ∈Ωi
 β 

∀zi ∈ Ωi .

(12)

In equation (12), Eπ i ( zi ) is the expected profit of supplier i over all possible random
decisions that can be made by his competitors (according to the belief distribution) when supplier
i chooses a base-stock level of zi . Therefore, the probability of each decision increases with the
expected profit of that decision. Parameter β shows the supplier’s limitation in choosing the
best decision. It is easy to see that when β → ∞ then all possible decisions will have the same
probability (uniform distribution). In other words, when β → ∞ the supplier has no tendency
toward the best decisions (the decisions are made in a completely random fashion). On the other
hand, β = 0 means that the supplier is perfectly rational and the best decision will always be
chosen with a probability of one.
Using an iterative algorithm, we can numerically find the equilibrium probability distribution
of suppliers’ decisions. Figure 1 shows, for example, the equilibrium distributions for different
values of β under the service competitions when the suppliers are identical. The problem
parameters are the same as what we used in our laboratory experiments. As we can see, the
equilibrium distribution becomes flatter as β increases.
Equilibrium Probability Distribution

0.14
0.12

β=1

0.10
0.08

β=3

0.06

β=5

0.04
0.02
0.00
0

10

20

30

40

50

z
Figure 1 –Equilibrium Probability Distribution of Decisions (QRE) under Service Competition
with Identical Suppliers
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We use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method to find the best value of β that
best explains the subjects’ behavior under each type of competition. More specifically, in this
method, we find the value of β that maximizes the likelihood of the occurrence of the observed
decisions under each type of competition. Let T be the total number of decisions made by each
subject (T=30 in our experiments) and m be the number of subjects. The set of all base-stock
decisions

made

by

subjects

during

an

experiment

can

then

be

defined

as

ℤ = { zit | i = 1,..., m and t = 1,..., T } . Hence, the logarithmic form of our likelihood function can

be written as
m

T

i =1

t

L( β | ℤ) = ∑∑ ln [ Pr( zit )] ,

(13)

where Pr( zit ) is calculated by (12). Tables 6 and 7 show the best values of β that maximize the
likelihood function under different types of competition, along with the corresponding expected
*
. Since different types of competition impose different levels of decision
base-stock level, zQRE

complexity to the subjects, we have considered a different value of β for each type of
*
competition. The value of zQRE
is, in fact, the average base-stock level under the Quantal

Response Equilibrium for the value of β that maximizes the likelihood of observing the
experimental data. The tables also list the p-values (one tailed test) that show the significance of
the differences between the Quantal Response Equilibrium and the subjects’ average decisions.
We can see the optimal value of β for the inventory competition is larger than the optimal value
of β for the service competition. Our discussion in section 7.1 regarding the shape of the profit
function should explain this behavior. The sharper slope of the profit function under service
competition makes it easier for the subjects to choose base-stock levels closer to the optimal
value (behave more rationally). We cannot extend this type argument to the optimal competition.
We can see the optimal value of β under optimal competition is smaller than optimal value of β
under inventory competition. This could be because random error is no longer the only major
factor affecting the subjects’ decisions. As we discussed in section 7.1, other factors such as loss
aversion and rival chasing play an influential role under this type competition, as well.
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Service Competition

Identical

Inventory Competition

different c

different h

z1 = z2

z1

z2

z1

z2

Nash Equilibrium

19

19

13

19

Quantal Response Eq.

21

21

16

21

β

Identical

different c

different h

z1 = z2

z1

z2

z1

z2

14

34

32

18

33

19

15

43

37

26

35

27

3.4

Experiment
p-value
*

(Experiment vs. zQRE )

11.2

24

19

15

21

19

54

41

27

36

34

0.000

<0.05

>0.05

>0.05

<0.05

0.019

0.139

0.244

0.500

0.000

Table 6 –Average QRE base-stock level under service and inventory competitions
Tables 8 and 9 compare the differences between the experimental results (subjects’ average
decisions) and the Nash equilibrium with the difference between the experimental results and the
QRE. These tables show the differences only when they are statistically significant (p < 0.05).
Optimal Competition
Identical

different c

different h

z1 = z2

z1

z2

z1

z2

Nash Equilibrium

77

77

42

77

44

Quantal Response Eq.

67

58

36

63

36

β

8.6

Experiment
p-value
*

(Experiment vs. zQRE )

68

51

43

58

51

0.151

0.001

0.000

0.001

0.000

Table 7 –Average QRE base-stock level under optimal competition
Tables 8 and 9 compare the differences between the experimental results (subjects’ average
decisions) and the Nash equilibrium with the difference between the experimental results and the
QRE. These tables show the differences only when they are statistically significant (p < 0.05).
Service Competition

Identical

different c

Inventory Competition
different h

Supp. 1

Supp. 2

Supp. 1

Supp. 2

Identical

different c

different h

Supp. 1

Supp. 1

Supp. 1

Supp. 1

z EXP − z *

4

−−

−−

−−

5

19

9

8

3

14

*
z EXP − zQRE

2

−−

−−

−−

4

12

−−

−−

−4

−−

Table 8 –The gap of Nash equilibrium and average QRE base-stock levels from the experimental
results (when the difference is statistically significant, p < 0.05)
We can see that, for service and inventory competitions, the QRE is either statistically equivalent
to the experimental results, or when there is a significant difference, the QRE is closer to the
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experimental results than the Nash equilibrium. In other words, the QRE falls between the
experimental results and the Nash equilibrium. The only exception is the more efficient supplier
when the suppliers have different inventory holding costs. In this case the QRE overestimates the
subjects’ decisions while the Nash equilibrium underestimates the subjects’ decisions.
Optimal Competition

Identical

z EXP − z
z EXP − z

*

*
QRE

different c

different h

Supp. 1

Supp. 2

Supp. 1

Supp. 2

−8

−26

−−

−19

6

4

−8

7

−6

14

Table 9 –The gap of Nash equilibrium and average QRE base-stock levels from the experimental
results (when the difference is statistically significant, p < 0.05)
Table 9 shows that the Quantal Response Equilibrium approach has less success in predicting
subjects’ behavior under optimal competition. That is, the difference between the experimental
results and the QRE is always statistically significant, and in two cases this difference is even
larger than the difference between the experimental results and the Nash equilibrium. As we
discussed in section 7.1, under optimal competition, other factors such as loss aversion and rival
chasing could play an influential role on subjects’ decisions. The QRE results specifically
confirms the rival chasing behavior. That is, the subjects’ decisions for the more efficient
suppliers are less than the QRE and the subjects’ decisions for the less efficient suppliers are
more than QRE.

8. Concluding Remarks
This research tries to contribute to the existing literature on supplier competition by examining,
through laboratory experiments, the theoretical results derived in this field. We conducted
experiments under three types of competition: service, inventory, and optimal. In each type of
competition, suppliers compete for the demand share of a single buyer based on a performance
measure (competition criteria) announced by the buyer. This performance measure is fill-rate
under service competition, base-stock level under inventory competition, and a combination of
fill-rate and base-stock level under optimal competition. Under each type of competition, we also
consider the impact of heterogeneity in suppliers’ cost structure.
While the buyer’s goal is to elicit high service level from its suppliers, our experimental
results confirm the theoretical, but counterintuitive, prediction that the buyer does not get the
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best result when she uses the same service measure as the competition criteria; based on which
the demand is allocated to the competing suppliers. Our results confirm that, using a proportional
allocation function, the average service level the buyer receives is higher if she uses suppliers’
base-stock level as the competition criteria. In other words, inventory competition is more
preferable than the service competition (buyer’s perspective).
Our experimental results also confirm the theoretical prediction that the optimal competition
criteria can induce the highest service level for the buyer. Although the experimental results for
optimal competition are not always as high as the Nash equilibrium prediction, the subjects’
average decisions under this type of competition are significantly higher than the subjects’
average decisions under service or inventory competitions.
Although our experimental results support the theoretical predictions in terms of the
comparative output of different types of competition, the average decisions made by subjects
does not always match the value predicted by the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium values
are closer to the experimental results under service competition, while under inventory and
optimal competition, the differences are more pronounced. The steeper slope of the suppliers’
profit function around the Nash equilibrium point can explain why it is easier for the subjects to
find the optimal decision under service competition. This slope gets flatter under inventory
competition and is more so under the optimal competition. Therefore, it becomes more difficult
for the subjects to find the best decisions. This means, although optimal competition is the most
desirable type of competition for the buyer, it comes with the cost of more difficulty for the
suppliers to find their best decisions.
The deviation of subjects’ decisions from the Nash equilibrium indicates that subjects do not
always behave purely in a rational way; as the Nash equilibrium assumes. A rational decision
maker always aim to find a decision that maximizes his expected profit, while he has the
cognitive power to find that decision. When the subjects’ decisions deviate from the Nash
equilibrium value, it can be due to the reason that the decision makers care about other factors in
addition to maximizing the expected profit. It can also be due to the reason that they do not have
the cognitive power to accurately find their best decisions. Our results suggest that the first type
of reasons is particularly affecting the subjects’ decisions under optimal competition. Loss
aversion can explains the less than Nash equilibrium average decisions of identical suppliers
under optimal competition. When the suppliers have different costs, rival chasing can explain
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why the average decisions of the two different types of suppliers move toward each other’s
decisions (with respect the Nash equilibrium predictions).
The subjects’ inability to accurately find their best decisions can be modeled by the Quantal
Response Equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the assumption is that each decision maker aims to
find the best decisions but makes random error along the way. We can see that the Quantal
Response Equilibrium predicts subjects’ behavior much better than Nash equilibrium,
specifically under service and inventory competition. The Quantal Response Equilibrium, under
service and inventory competitions, either captures the subjects’ average decisions or
underestimates them (with just one exception). The reason behind subjects’ tendency to choose
base-stock decision that is higher than either Nash equilibrium or Quantal Response Equilibrium
is not clear and needs further investigation. Even when the Quantal Response Equilibrium is
statistically different from the subjects’ average decisions, it makes a prediction that is (almost
always) closer to the subjects’ average decisions than what Nash equilibrium predicts.
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